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Understanding how institutional changes within academia may affect the overall potential of sci-
ence requires a better quantitative representation of how careers evolve over time. Since knowledge
spillovers, cumulative advantage, competition, and collaboration are distinctive features of the aca-
demic profession, both the employment relationship and the procedures for assigning recognition
and allocating funding should be designed to account for these factors. We study the annual pro-
duction ni(t) of a given scientist i by analyzing longitudinal career data for 200 leading scientists
and 100 assistant professors from the physics community. We compare our results with 21,156
sports careers. Our empirical analysis of individual productivity dynamics shows that (i) there are
increasing returns for the top individuals within the competitive cohort, and that (ii) the distribu-
tion of production growth is a leptokurtic “tent-shaped” distribution that is remarkably symmetric.
Our methodology is general, and we speculate that similar features appear in other disciplines
where academic publication is essential and collaboration is a key feature. We introduce a model
of proportional growth which reproduces these two observations, and additionally accounts for the
significantly right-skewed distributions of career longevity and achievement in science. Using this
theoretical model, we show that short-term contracts can amplify the effects of competition and
uncertainty making careers more vulnerable to early termination, not necessarily due to lack of
individual talent and persistence, but because of random negative production shocks. We show that
fluctuations in scientific production are quantitatively related to a scientist’s collaboration radius
and team efficiency.
Institutional change could alter the relationship be-
tween Science and scientists as well as the longstanding
patronage system in academia [1, 2]. Some recent shifts
in academia include the changing business structure of re-
search universities [3], shifts in the labor supply-demand
balance [4], a bottleneck in the number of tenure track
positions [5], and a related policy shift away from long-
term contracts [3, 6]. Along these lines, significant fac-
tors for consideration are the increasing range in research
team size [7], the economic organization required to fund
and review collaborative research projects, and the evolv-
ing definition of the role of the academic research profes-
sor [3].
The role of individual performance metrics in career
appraisal, in domains as diverse as sports [8, 9], finance
[10, 11], and academia, is increasing in this data rich
age. In the case of academia, as the typical size of scien-
tific collaborations increases [7], the allocation of funding
and the association of recognition at the varying scales
of science (individual  group  institution [12]) has
become more complex. Indeed, scientific achievement is
becoming increasingly linked to online visibility in a con-
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siderable reputation tournament [13].
Here we seek to identify (i) quantitative patterns in the
scientific career trajectory towards a better understand-
ing of career dynamics and achievement [14–20], and (ii)
how scientific production responds to policies concerning
contract length. Using rich productivity data available
at the level of single individuals, we analyze longitudinal
career data keeping in mind the the roles of spillovers,
group size, and career sustainability. Although our em-
pirical analysis is limited to careers in physics, our ap-
proach is general. We speculate that similar features de-
scribe other disciplines where academic publication is a
primary indicator and collaboration is a key feature.
Specifically, we analyze production data for 300 physi-
cists i = 1...300 who are distributed into 3 groups: (a)
Group A corresponds to the 100 most cited physicists
with average h-index 〈h〉 = 61 ± 21, (b) Group B cor-
responds to 100 additional highly-cited physicists with
〈h〉 = 44 ± 15, and (c) Group C corresponds to 100 as-
sistant professors in 50 U.S. physics departments with
〈h〉 = 15 ± 7. We define the annual production ni(t) as
the number of papers published by scientist i in year t
of his/her career. We focus on academic careers from
the physics community to approximately control for sig-
nificant cross-disciplinary production variations. Using
the same set of scientists, a companion study has ana-
lyzed the rank-ordered citation distribution of each sci-
entist with a focus on the statistical regularities underly-
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2ing publication impact [17]. We provide further descrip-
tion of the data and present a parallel analysis of 21,156
sports careers in the Supporting Information Appendix
(SI) text.
We begin this paper with empirical analysis of longi-
tudinal career data. Our empirical evidences serve as
statistical benchmarks used in the final section where we
develop a stochastic proportional growth model. In par-
ticular, our model shows that a short-term appraisal sys-
tem can result in a significant number of “sudden” early
deaths due to unavoidable negative production shocks.
This result is consistent with a Matthew Effect model
[16] and recent academic career survival analysis [21],
which demonstrate how young careers can be stymied
by the difficulty in overcoming early achievement barri-
ers. Altogether, our results indicate that short-term con-
tracts may increase the strength of the “rich-get-richer”
mechanism in science [22, 23] and may hinder the upward
mobility of young scientists.
I. RESULTS
A. Scientific production and the career trajectory
The academic career depends on many factors, such as
cumulative advantage [16, 19, 22, 23], the “sacred spark,”
[24, 25], and other complex aspects of knowledge trans-
fer manifest in our techno-social world [26]. To exem-
plify this complexity, a recent case study on the impact
trajectories of Nobel prize winners shows that “scientific
career shocks” marked by the publication of an individ-
ual’s “magnum opus” work(s) can trigger future recogni-
tion and reward, resembling the cascading dynamics of
earthquakes [27].
We model the career trajectory as a sequence of scien-
tific outputs which arrive at the variable rate ni(t). Since
the reputation of a scientist is typically a cumulative rep-
resentation of his/her contributions, we consider the cu-
mulative production Ni(t) ≡
∑t
t′=1 ni(t
′) as a proxy for
career achievement. Fig. 1(A) shows the cumulative pro-
duction Ni(t) of six notable careers which display a tem-
poral scaling relation Ni(t) ≈ Aitαi where αi is a scaling
exponent that quantifies the career trajectory dynam-
ics. The average and standard deviation of the αi values
calculated for each dataset are 〈αi〉 = 1.42 ± 0.29 [A],
1.44 ± 0.26 [B], and 1.30 ± 0.31 [C]. We justify this 2-
parameter model in the SI Appendix text using scaling
methods and data collapse.
There are also numerous cases of Ni(t) which do not
exhibit such regularity (see Fig. S1), but instead display
marked non-stationarity and non-linearity arising from
significant exogenous career shocks. Positive shocks, pos-
sibly corresponding to just a single discovery, can spur
significant productivity and reputation growth [24, 27].
Negative shocks, such as in the case of scientific fraud,
can end the career rather suddenly. We also acknowledge
that the end of the career is a difficult phase to analyze,
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FIG. 1: Persistent accelerating career growth. (A) The ca-
reer trajectory Ni(t) ∼ tαi of six stellar careers from varying
age cohorts. The αi value characterizes the career persis-
tence, where careers with α > 1 are accelerating. αi val-
ues calculated using OLS regression in alphabetical order
are: α = 1.25 ± 0.02, α = 1.72 ± 0.02, α = 1.62 ± 0.04,
α = 1.23±0.02, α = 1.34±0.05, α = 1.35±0.04. (B) Defined
in Eq. [1], the average career trajectory 〈N ′(t)〉 calculated
from 100 individual Ni(t) in each dataset demonstrates ro-
bust accelerating career growth within each cohort. We use
the normalized career trajectory N ′i(t) in order to aggregate
Ni(t) with varying publication rates 〈ni〉. As a result, the ag-
gregate scaling exponent α quantifies the acceleration of the
typical career over time, independent of 〈ni〉. For the scien-
tific careers, we calculate α values: 1.28±0.01 [A], 1.31±0.01
[B], and 1.15 ± 0.02 [C]. These values are all significantly
greater than unity, α > 1, indicating that cumulative advan-
tage in science is closely related to knowledge and production
spillovers. We calculate α using OLS regression and plot the
corresponding best-fit lines (dashed) for each dataset.
since such an event can occur quite abruptly, and so our
analysis is mainly concerned with the growth phase and
not the termination phase.
In order to analyze the average properties of Ni(t) for
all 300 scientists in our sample, we define the normalized
trajectory N ′i(t) ≡ Ni(t)/〈ni〉. The quantity 〈ni〉 is the
average annual production of author i, with N ′i(Li) = Li
by construction (Li corresponds to the career length of
3individual i). Fig. 1(B) shows the characteristic produc-
tion trajectory obtained by averaging together the 100
N ′i(t) belonging to each dataset,
〈N ′(t)〉 ≡
〈Ni(t)
〈ni〉
〉
≡ 1
100
100∑
i=1
Ni(t)
〈ni〉 . (1)
The standard deviation σ(N ′(t)) shown in Fig. S2(B)
begins to decrease after roughly 20 years for dataset [A]
and [B] scientists. Over this horizon, the stochastic ar-
rival of career shocks can significantly alter the career
trajectory [20, 24, 27, 28]. Each N ′i(t) exhibits robust
scaling corresponding to the scaling law 〈N ′(t)〉 ∼ tα.
This regularity reflects the abundance of of careers with
αi > 1 corresponding to accelerated career growth. This
acceleration is consistent with increasing returns arising
from knowledge and production spillovers.
B. Fluctuations in scientific output over the
academic career
Individuals are constantly entering and exiting the
professional market, with birth and death rates depend-
ing on complex economic and institutional factors. Due
to competition, decisions and performance at the early
stages of the career can have long lasting consequences
[16, 29]. To better understand career uncertainty por-
trayed by the common saying “publish or perish” [30],
we analyze the outcome fluctuation
ri(t) ≡ ni(t)− ni(t−∆t) (2)
of career i in year t over the time interval ∆t = 1 year.
Fig. 2(A) and (B) show the unconditional pdf of r values
which are leptokurtic but remarkably symmetric, illus-
trating the endogenous frequencies of positive and nega-
tive output growth. Output fluctuations arise naturally
from the lulls and bursts in both the mental and physical
capabilities of humans [31, 32]. Moreover, the statistical
regularities in the annual production change distribution
indicate a striking resemblance to the growth rate distri-
bution of countries, firms, and universities [33, 34].
To better account for individual growth factors, we
next define the normalized production change
r′i(t) ≡ [ri(t)− 〈ri〉]/σi(r) (3)
which is measured in units of the fluctuation scale σi(r)
unique to each career. We measure the average 〈ri〉 and
the standard deviation σi(r) of each career using the first
Li available years for each scientist i. r
′
i(t) is a better
measure for comparing career uncertainty, since individ-
uals have production factors that depend on the type
of research, the size of the collaboration team, and the
position within the team. Fig. 2(C) show that P (r′),
the probability density function (pdf) of r′ measured in
units of standard deviation, is well approximated by a
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FIG. 2: Empirical evidence for the proportional growth
model of career production. (A) Probability density func-
tion (pdf) of the annual production change r in the number
of papers published over a ∆t = 1 year period. In the bulk of
each P (r), the growth distribution is approximately double-
exponential (Laplace). (B) To test the stability of the distri-
bution over career trajectory subintervals, we separate ri(t)
values into 5 non-overlapping 10-year periods and verify the
stability of the Laplace P (r). For each P (r), we also plot the
corresponding Laplace distribution (solid line) with standard
deviation σ and mean µ ≈ 0 calculated using the maximum
likelihood estimator method. To improve graphical clarity,
we vertically offset each P (r) by a constant factor. For vi-
sual comparison, we also plot a Normal distribution (dashed
black curve) with σ ≡ 1 which instead decays parabolically
on the log-linear axes. (C) Accounting for individual produc-
tion factors by using the normalized production change r′,
the resulting pdfs P (r′) collapse onto a Gaussian distribution
with unit variance. Deviations in the tails likely correspond
to extreme “career shocks.” (D) The cumulative distribution
CDF (X ≥ Si) is exponential, indicating that the uncondi-
tional distributions P (r) in (A) and (B) follow from an expo-
nential mixing of conditional Gaussian distributions P (r|Si).
Gaussian distribution with unit variance. The data col-
lapse of each P (r′) onto the predicted Gaussian distribu-
tion (solid green curve) indicates that individual output
fluctuations are consistent with a proportional growth
model. We note that the remaining deviations in the
tails for |r′| ≥ 3 are likely signatures of the exogenous
career shocks that are not accounted for by an endoge-
nous proportional growth model.
The ability to collaborate on large projects, both in
close working teams and in extreme examples as remote
agents (i.e. Wikipedia [35]), is one of the foremost prop-
erties of human society. In science, the ability to attract
future opportunities is strongly related to production and
knowledge spillovers [28, 36, 37] that are facilitated by the
4collaboration network [7, 12, 38–42]. Indeed, there is a
tipping point in a scientific career that occurs when a sci-
entist’s knowledge investment reaches a critical mass that
can sustain production over a long horizon, and when
a scientist becomes an attractor (as opposed to a pur-
suer) of new collaboration/production opportunities. To
account for collaboration, we calculate for each author
the number ki(t) of distinct coauthors per year and then
define his/her collaboration radius Si as the median of
the set of his/her ki(t) values, Si ≡ Med[ki(t)]. We use
the median instead of the average 〈ki(t)〉 since extremely
large ki(t) values can occur in specific fields such as high-
energy physics and astronomy.
Given the complex scientific coauthorship network,
we ask the question: what is the typical number of
unique coauthors per year? Fig. 2(D) shows the cu-
mulative distribution function CDF (Si) of Si values for
each data set. The approximately linear form on log-
linear axes indicates that Si is exponentially distributed,
P (Si) ∼ exp[−λSi]. We calculate λ = 0.15 ± 0.01 [A],
λ = 0.11 ± 0.01 [B], and λ = 0.11 ± 0.01 [C]. The ex-
ponential size distribution has been shown to emerge
in complex systems where linear preferential attachment
governs the acquisition of new opportunities [43]. This
result shows that the leptokurtic “tent-shaped” distribu-
tion P (r) in Fig. 2 follows from the exponential mixing
of heterogenous conditional Gaussian distributions [44].
The exponential mixture of Gaussians decomposes the
unconditional distribution P (r) into a mixture of condi-
tional Gaussian distributions
P (r|Si) = exp[−r2/2V Sψi ]/
√
2piV Sψi , (4)
each with a fluctuation scale σi(r) depending on Si by
the scaling relation
σ2i (r) ≈ V Sψi . (5)
Hence, the mixture is parameterized by ψ
Pψ(r) =
∫ ∞
0
P (r|S)P (S)dS ≈
∑
i=1
Pi(r|Si)P (Si) . (6)
The independent case ψ = 0 results in a Gaussian Pψ(r)
and the linear case ψ = 1 results in a Laplace (double-
exponential) Pψ(r). See the SI Appendix text and ref.
[44] for further discussion of the ψ dependence of Pψ(r).
C. The size-variance relation and group efficiency
The values of ψ for scientific and athletic careers follow
from the different combination of physical and intellec-
tual inputs that enter the production function for the
two distinct professions. Academic knowledge is typi-
cally a non-rival good, and so knowledge-intensive pro-
fessions are characterized by spillovers, both over time
and across collaborations [36, 37], consistent with αi > 1
and ψ > 0. Interestingly, Azoulay et al. show evidence
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FIG. 3: Quantitative relations between career growth, career
risk, and collaboration efficiency. The fluctuations in produc-
tion reflect the unpredictable horizon of “career shocks” which
can affect the ability of a scientists to access new creative op-
portunities. (A) Relation between average annual production
〈ni〉 and collaboration radius Si ≡Med[ki] shows a decreasing
marginal output per collaborator as demonstrated by sublin-
ear ψ < 1. Interestingly, dataset [A] scientists have on average
a larger output-to-input efficiency. (B) The production fluc-
tuation scale σi(r) is a quantitative measure for uncertainty
in academic careers, with scaling relation σi(r) ∼ Sψ/2i . (C)
Management, coordination, and training inefficiencies can re-
sult in a γ < 1 corresponding to a decreasing marginal re-
turn with each additional coauthor input. The significantly
larger γ value for dataset [A] scientists seems to suggest that
managerial abilities related to output efficiency is a common
attribute of top scientists.
5for production spillovers in the 5–8% decrease in output
by scientists who were close collaborators with a “super-
star” scientists who died suddenly [28].
We now formalize the quantitative link between scien-
tific collaboration [38, 39] and career growth given by the
size-variance scaling relation in Eq. [5] visualized in the
scatter plot in Fig. 3(B). Using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression of the data on log-log scale, we cal-
culate ψ/2 ≈ 0.40 ± 0.03 (R = 0.77) for dataset [A],
ψ/2 ≈ 0.22± 0.04 (R = 0.51) [B], and ψ/2 ≈ 0.26± 0.05
(R = 0.45) [C]. Interdependent tasks characteristic of
group collaborations typically involve partially overlap-
ping efforts. Hence, the empirical ψ values are signifi-
cantly less than the value ψ = 1 that one would expect
from the sum of Si independent random variables with
approximately equal variance V . Collectively, these em-
pirical evidences serve as coherent motivations for the the
preferential capture growth model that we propose in the
following section.
Alternatively, it is also possible to estimate ψ using
the relation between the average annual production 〈ni〉
and the collaboration radius Si. The input-output re-
lation 〈ni〉 ∼ Sψi quantifies the collaboration efficiency,
with ψ = 0.74 ± 0.04 (R = 0.87) for dataset [A] and
ψ = 0.25±0.04 (R = 0.37) for dataset [B]. If the autocor-
relation between sequential production values ni(t) and
ni(t + 1) is relatively small, then we expect the scaling
exponents calculated for 〈ni〉 and σ2i (r) to be approxi-
mately equal. This result follows from considering ri(t)
as the convolution of an underlying production distribu-
tion Pi(n) for each scientist that is approximately stable.
Interestingly, the larger ψ values calculated for dataset
[A] scientists suggests that prestige is related to the in-
creasing returns in the scientific production function [45].
Next we use an alternative method to estimate the
annual collaboration efficiency by relating the number
of publications ni(t) in a given year to the number of
distinct coauthors ki(t) over the same year. We use a
single-factor production function,
ni(t) ≈ qi[ki(t)]γi , (7)
to quantify the relation between output and labor in-
puts with a scaling exponent γi. We estimate qi and
γi for each author using OLS regression, and define the
normalized output measure Qi ∝ ni(t)/ki(t)γi using the
best-fit qi and γi values calculated for each scientist i.
Fig. 3(C) shows the efficiency parameter γ calculated
by aggregating all careers in each dataset, and indicates
that this aggregate γ is approximately equal to the av-
erage 〈γi〉 calculated from the γi values in each career
dataset: γ = 0.68 ± 0.01 [A], γ = 0.52 ± 0.01 [B], and
γ = 0.51± 0.02 [C]. Furthermore, the ψ and γ values are
approximately equal, which is not surprising, since both
scaling exponents are efficiency measures that relate the
scaling relation of output ni(t) per input ki(t).
D. A Proportional growth model for scientific
output
We develop a stochastic model as a heuristic tool to
better understand the effects of long-term versus short-
term contracts. In this competition model, opportunities
(i.e. new scientific publications) are captured according
to a general mechanism whereby the capture rate Pi(t)
depends on the appraisal wi(t) of an individual’s record
of achievement over a prescribed history. We define the
appraisal to be an exponentially weighted average over a
given individual’s history of production
wi(t) ≡
t−1∑
∆t=1
ni(t−∆t)e−c∆t , (8)
which is characterized by the appraisal horizon 1/c. We
use the value c = 0 to represent a long-term appraisal
(tenure) system and a value c  1 to represent a short-
term appraisal system. Each agent i = 1...I simultane-
ously attracts new opportunities at a rate
Pi(t) = wi(t)
pi∑I
i=1 wi(t)
pi
. (9)
until all P opportunities for a given period t are cap-
tured. We assume that each agent has the production
potential of one unit per period, and so the total number
of opportunities distributed per period P is equal to the
number of competing agents, P ≡ I.
We use Monte Carlo (MC) simulation to analyze this
2-parameter model over the course of t = 1...T sequential
periods. In each production period (i.e. representing a
characteristic time to publication), a fixed number of P
production units are captured by the competing agents.
At the end of each period, we update each wi(t) and then
proceed to simulate the next preferential capture period
t+1. Since Pi(t) depends on the relative achievements of
every agent, the relative competitive advantage of one in-
dividual over another is determined by the parameter pi.
In the SI Appendix text we elaborate in more detail the
results of our simulation of synthetic careers dynamics.
We vary pi and c for a labor force of size I ≡ 1000 and
maximum lifetime T ≡ 100 periods as a representative
size and duration of a real labor cohort. Our results are
general, and for sufficiently large system size, the quali-
tative features of the results do not depend significantly
on the choice of I or T .
The case with pi = 0 corresponds to a random capture
model that has (i) no appraisal and (ii) no preferential
capture. Hence, in this null model, opportunities are
captured at a Poisson rate λp = 1 per period. The results
of this model (see Fig. S13) shows that almost all careers
obtain the maximum career length T with a typical career
trajectory exponent 〈αi〉 ≈ 1. Comparing to simulations
with pi > 0 and c ≥ 0, the null model is similar to a
“long-term” appraisal system (c → 0) with sub-linear
preferential capture (pi < 1). In such systems, the long-
term appraisal timescale averages out fluctuations, and
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FIG. 4: Monte Carlo simulation of the linear preferential capture model (pi = 1) for varying contract length parametrized by c.
We plot the probability distributions for (i) Ni, the total number of opportunities captured by the end period T , (ii) the growth
acceleration exponent αi, (iii) the single period growth fluctuation ri(t) including for comparison the Laplace (solid green)
and Gaussian (dashed red) best-fit distributions calculated using the respective MLE estimator, and (iv) the career longevity
Li defined as the time difference between an agent’s first and last captured opportunity. Results for c → 0 systems shows
that for a “long-term appraisal” scenario careers are less vulnerable to low-production phases, and as a result, most agents
sustain production throughout the career. Conversely, results for c ≥ 1 systems show that for a “short-term appraisal” scenario
the labor system is driven by fluctuations that can cause career “sudden death” for a large fraction of the population. In this
short-term appraisal model, there are typically a small number of agents who are able to capture the majority of the production
opportunities with remarkably accelerating career growth reflected by significantly large αi ≥ 1. Thus, a few “lucky” agents are
able to survive the initial fluctuations and end up dominating the system. In the SI text and Figs. S12-S16, we further show
that systems with increased levels of competition (pi > 1) mimic systems with short term contracts, resulting in productivity
“death traps” whereby most careers stagnate and terminate early.
so careers are significantly less vulnerable to periods of
low production and hence more sustainable since they are
not determined primarily by early career fluctuations.
However, as pi increases, the strength of competitive
advantage in the system increases, and so some careers
are “squeezed out” by the larger more dominant careers.
This effect is compounded by short-term appraisal cor-
responding to c ≈ 1. In such systems with super-linear
capture rates and/or relatively large c, most individuals
experience “sudden death” termination relatively early in
the career. Meanwhile, a small number of “stars” survive
the initial selection process, which is governed primarily
by random chance, and dominate the system.
We found drastically different lifetime distributions
when we varied the appraisal (contract) length (see Figs.
S12 – S16). In the case of linear preferential capture
with a long-term appraisal system c = 0, we find that
10% of the labor population terminates before reaching
career age 0.94T (where T is the maximum career length
or “retirement age”), and only 25% of the labor popula-
tion terminates before reaching career age 0.98T . On the
contrary, in a short-term appraisal system with c = 1,
we find that 10% of the labor population terminates be-
fore reaching age 0.01T , and 25% of the labor population
dies before reaching age 0.02T (see Table S1). Hence, in
model short contract systems, the longevity, output, and
impact of careers are largely determined by fluctuations
and not by persistence.
Fig. 4 shows the MC results for pi = 1. For c ≥ 1 we
observe a drastic shift in the career longevity distribution
P (L), which becomes heavily right-skewed with most ca-
reers terminating extremely early. This observation is
consistent with the predictions of an analytically solv-
able Matthew effect model [16] which demonstrates that
many careers have difficulty making forward progress due
to the relative disadvantage associated with early career
7inexperience. However, due to the nature of zero-sum
competition, there are a few “big winners” who survive
for the entire duration T and who acquire a majority of
the opportunities allocated during the evolution of the
system. Quantitatively, the distribution P (N) becomes
extremely heavy-tailed due to agents with α > 2 corre-
sponding to extreme accelerating career growth. Despite
the fact that all the agents are endowed initially with
the same production potential, some agents emerge as
superstars following stochastic fluctuations at relatively
early stages of the career, thus reaping the full benefits
of cumulative advantage.
II. DISCUSSION
An ongoing debate involving academics, university ad-
ministration, and educational policy makers concerns
the definition of professorship and the case for lifetime
tenure, as changes in the economics of university growth
have now placed tenure under the review process [3, 6].
Critics of tenure argue that tenure places too much fi-
nancial risk burden on the modern competitive research
university and diminishes the ability to adapt to shift-
ing economic, employment, and scientific markets. To
address these changes, universities and other research in-
stitutes have shifted away from tenure at all levels of
academia in the last thirty years towards meeting staff
needs with short-term and non-tenure track positions [3].
For knowledge intensive domains, production is char-
acterized by long-term spillovers both through time and
through the knowledge network of associated ideas and
agents. A potential drawback of professions designed
around short-term contracts is that there is an implicit
expectation of sustained annual production that effec-
tively discounts the cumulative achievements of the in-
dividual. Consequently, there is a possibility that short-
term contracts may reduce the incentives for a young sci-
entist to invest in human and social capital accumulation.
Moreover, we highlight the importance of an employment
relationship that is able to combine positive competitive
pressure with adequate safeguards to protect against ca-
reer hazards and endogenous production uncertainty an
individual is likely to encounter in his/her career.
In an attempt to render a more objective review pro-
cess for tenure and other lifetime achievement awards,
quantitative measures for scientific publication impact
are increasing in use and variety [17–20, 24, 27, 46, 47].
However, many quantifiable benchmarks such as the h-
index [17] do not take into account collaboration size
or discipline specific factors. Measures for the compari-
son of scientific achievement should at least account for
variable collaboration, publication, and citation factors
[19, 46, 47]. Hence, such open problems call for further
research into the quantitative aspects of scientific output
using comprehensive longitudinal data for not just the
extremely prolific scientists, but the entire labor force.
Current scientific trends indicate that there will be
further increases in typical team sizes that will forward
the emergent complexity arising from group dynamics
[7, 12, 42]. There is an increasing need for individ-
ual/group production measures, such as the output mea-
sure Q, following from Eq. [7], which accounts for
group efficiency factors. Normalized production mea-
sures which account for coauthorship factors have been
proposed in [19, 46], but the measures proposed therein
do not account for the variations in team productivity.
The complexity of large collaborations raises open
questions concerning scientific productivity and the or-
ganization of teams. We measure a decreasing marginal
returns γ < 1 with increasing group size which identi-
fies the importance of team management. A theory of
labor productivity can help improve our understanding
of institutional growth, for organizations ranging in size
from scientific collaborations to universities, firms, and
countries [33, 34, 44, 47–50].
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I. DATA
To test the intriguing possibility that competition leads to common growth patterns in complex systems of arbitrary
size S, we analyze the production dynamics of two professions that are dissimilar in many regards, but share the
common underlying driving force of competition for limited resources. In order to establish empirical facts that we
believe are independent of the details of a given competitive profession, we analyze a large dataset of production ni(t)
values and corresponding growth fluctuation ri(t) ≡ ni(t) − ni(t − 1) values. We define the appropriate measures
for ni(t) to be (a) the annual number of papers published by scientist i and (b) the seasonal performance metrics
of professional athlete i. While these two professions both display a high level of competition, they differ in their
employment term structure and salary scale. In the case of academia, the tenure system rewards high performance
levels with lifelong employment (tenure). In contrast, professional sports are characterized by relatively short contracts
that emphasize continued performance over a shorter time frame and thereby exploit the high levels of athletic prowess
in a player’s peak years. The large number of careers in these two professions readily lend themselves to quantitative
analysis because the data that quantify the career production trajectory are precisely defined and comprehensive
throughout an individual’s entire career. Furthermore, because of the generic nature of competition, we use these two
distinct professions to compare and contrast the distribution of career impact measures across a cohort of competitors.
The datasets we analyze are:
I : Academia:
We analyze the publication careers of 300 physicists which we categorize in 3 subsets each consisting of 100
individuals:
(A) Dataset A corresponds to the 100 most-cited physicists according to the citation shares metric [19]
(with average h-index 〈h〉 = 61± 21). These 100 careers constitute 3,951 ri(t) values.
(B) Dataset B corresponds to the 100 other “control” scientists, taken approximately randomly from the
same physics database (with average h-index 〈h〉 = 44± 15). In the selection process for dataset B, we
only consider scientists who have published between 10 and 50 articles in PRL over the 50-year period
1958-2008. These 100 careers constitute 3,534 ri(t) values.
(C) Dataset C corresponds to 100 Assistant Professors (with average h-index 〈h〉 = 15±7), where we select
two physicists from each of the top-50 U.S Physics & Astronomy Departments (according to the U.S.
News rankings). These Asst. Profs. are assumed to be early in their career and relatively accomplished
given the difficulty in obtaining such a position in any given university. These 100 careers constitute
1,050 ri(t) values.
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2In order to control for discipline-specific citation patterns, we select individuals in dataset A and B from set of all
scientists who have published in Physical Review Letters (PRL) over the 50-year period 1958–2008. As a measure of
output, we define ni(t) as the number of papers published in year t of the career of individual i, where year t = 1
corresponds to the year of the first publication on record for author i. We downloaded the complete publication
records of the scientists in datasets A and B from ISI Web of Science (http://www.isiknowledge.com/) in Jan.
2010, and we downloaded the complete publication records of the scientists in dataset C from ISI Web of Science in
Oct. 2010. We used the “Distinct Author Sets” function provided by ISI in order to increase the likelihood that only
papers published by each given author are analyzed.
II : Major League Baseball (MLB):
We analyze 17,292 baseball players over the 90-year period 1920-2009 using comprehensive league data obtained
from Sean Lahman’s Baseball Archive accessed at http://baseball1.com/index.php. We separate the career
data into two distinct subsets: non-pitchers (players not on record as having pitched during a game) and pitchers.
(A) For non-pitchers, we analyze two batting metrics: an “opportunity metric” - at-bats (AB), and a
“success” metric - hits (H). Together, these 8,993 careers constitute 43,043 ri(t) values.
(B) For pitchers, we analyze two pitching metrics: an “opportunity metric” - innings-pitched measured in
outs (IPO), and a “success” metric - strikeouts (K). Together, these 8,299 careers constitute 33,965
ri(t) values.
III : National Basketball Association (NBA):
We analyze 3,864 basketball careers, constituting 15,316 ri(t) values, over the 63-year period
1946–2008 using data obtained from Data Base Sports Basketball Archive accessed at
http://www.databasebasketball.com/. We analyze two player metrics:
(A) an “opportunity metric” - minutes played (Min.), and
(B) a “success” metric - points scored (Pts.)
Since sports careers typically peak for athletes around age 30, we account for a time-dependent career trajectory
which is dominant in most sports careers by “detrended” the measures for career growth fluctuations. In the case
where we do not account for a individual fluctuation scale,
Ri ≡ [ri(t)− r(t)]/σ(t) . (S1)
In this case we detrend with respect to the average production difference r(t) and the standard deviation of production
difference σ(t) which are calculated using all careers from a given sports league, conditional on the career year t.
In the case where we do account for individual variations, we first define zi(t) ≡ (ri(t)− 〈ri〉)/σi to be normalized
with respect to the individual career scales 〈ri〉 and σi which are the average and standard deviation of the production
change of athlete career i. Then we define the detrended growth rate as
R′i ≡ [zi(t)− 〈z(t)〉]/σz(t) , (S2)
where in this case we detrend with respect to the average 〈z(t)〉 and standard deviation σz(t) calculated by collecting
all zi(t) values for a given career year t. This detrending better accounts for the relatively strong time-dependent
growth patterns in sports.
In this section we analyze the annual production of scientists measured as the number of papers published ni(t)
over the period of a year. Using this measure does not account for the variability in the length of production, say in
the number of pages, nor does it account for the impact of the paper, a quantity commonly approximated by a paper’s
citation number. Instead, we consider a simple definition that a scientific product is a final output of a collection of
inputs. Furthermore, in science it is assumed that the peer review process establishes a quality threshold so that only
manuscripts above a certain quality and novelty standard can be published and incorporated into the scientific body
of knowledge.
Prior theories of scientific production have also used the number of publications as a proxy for scientific output.
In particular, the Shockely model [14] proposed a simple multiplicative factor model for the production ni(t) which
predicts a log-normal distribution for P (n). An alternative null model for ni(t) is the Poisson process, which assumes
that each individual is endowed with a rate parameter ω related to an individual’s production factors. This model
predicts a Poisson distribution for P (n). However, a shortfall of these models is that multiplicative parameters in
3the Shockley model and the rate parameter ω are difficult to measure, especially if the set of individuals span a large
range of production factors, and moreover, if the careers are non-stationary.
Fig. S8 shows the unconditional probability distribution P (n) calculated by aggregating all ni(t) values for all
scientists and all years into an aggregate dataset. Naively, the distributions are well-fit by the Log-normal distribution,
and so there is an apparent agreement with the multiplicative factor Shockley model. However, the distribution
P (n) =
∑100
i=1 P (n|Si) is the aggregate distribution constructed from 100 individual career trajectories ni(t), each
with varying size Si. Indeed, we demonstrate in Figs. 1 and S1 to be non-linear, with time-dependent residuals
around the moving average. Hence, it is not possible from the unconditional pdf P (n) to determine if the process
underlying scientific production corresponds to a simple multiplicative process or a Poisson process.
In order to better account for the variable size Si of each career which affects the rate at which an individual is
able to capture publication opportunities, we plot in Fig. S7 the pdf of the normalized output
Qi =
ni(t)
fi(k)
. (S3)
We calculate the normalization factor fi(k) = qi[ki(t)]
γi for each individual i by estimating the parameters qi and γi
for each scientist i from the single-factor model
ni = qik
γi
i . (S4)
where ni(t) is the annual production in year t and ki(t) is the total number of distinct coauthors in year t. Hence, Qi
represents the production factor above Q > 1 or below Q < 1 what would be expected from the author i given the fact
that he/she had additional inputs from ki(t)−1 individuals that year. This model assumes that the major component
contributing to production is the collaboration degree k of the research output, and also assumes that the input of
each coauthor contributes equally to the final output. Clearly, these assumptions neglect some important idiosyncratic
details affecting scientific publication, but given the incomplete information associated with every publication, it is
a decent approximation. We estimate qi and γi by performing a linear regression of log ni and log ki using the first
Li years of each career, neglecting years with ni = 0. We use Li = 35 years for dataset [A] and [B] scientists, and
Li = 10 years for dataset [C] scientists.
In Fig. 3(c) we approximate γ using all n(t) within each dataset with k ≤ 50, and performing a regression of the
model
lnn = ln q + γ ln k +  (S5)
to estimate γ, where  is the residual due to other unaccounted production factors. For each dataset we find that the
aggregate efficiency parameter γ is approximately equal to the average 〈γi〉 calculated from the 100 γi values in each
career dataset: γ = 0.68 ± 0.01 [A], γ = 0.52 ± 0.01 [B], and γ = 0.51 ± 0.02 [C]. Furthermore, the ψ ≈ γ since the
size-variance scaling parameter ψ is also an efficiency measure that relates the scaling of output n to input k.
As a result of this analysis, we quantify the scaling exponent γ < 1 of the decreasing marginal returns in the scientific
production function for projects with k ≤ 50. This likely stems from the inefficient management costs associated with
large group collaborations which typically manifest in a larger production timescale. In fact, for years with k ≥ 50
coauthors, scientific output shows decreasing returns to scale. Interestingly, the star scientists in dataset [A] display
significantly larger efficiency, quantitatively showing the importance of management skills in scientific success.
The normalized production values are normalized to units of “expected production” conditional on the ki inputs
for author i. We aggregate all data from each dataset and show in Fig. S7 that the Q values are well-described by
the Gamma distribution
P (Q) = Qm−1
exp[−Q/θ]
θmΓ(m)
(S6)
where m is the shape parameter and θ is the scale parameter. Surprisingly, we find that dataset [A] and [B] have
approximately equal Gamma parameters, indicating that besides their production efficiency, top scientists are virtually
indistinguishable with average normalized output 〈Q〉 = mθ > 1. For each dataset we calculate the Gamma parameters
using the maximum likelihood estimator method: m = 5.45 and θ = 0.21 [A], m = 5.60 and θ = 0.20 [B], and
m = 7.00 and θ = 0.15 [C]. We leave it as an open question to determine why the Gamma distribution describes so
well the production statistics. We ponder the intriguing possibility that the stochastic dynamics underlying individual
production corresponds to an increasing Le´vy process with variable jump length which is known to produce a Gamma
distribution.
4II. QUANTIFYING THE CAREER TRAJECTORY
The reputation of an individual is typically cumulative, based on the total sum of achievements, which we approx-
imate by the cumulative output Ni(t) (e.i. number of papers published by year t). In Figs. 1 and S1 we plot Ni(t)
for several individuals. The careers presented in Fig. 1 are more linear, indicating quantifiable career trajectory that
has the approximate form
Ni(t) =
t∑
t′=1
ni(t
′) ≈ Ai tαi , t < Ti (S7)
where ni(t) are the number of papers in year t of the scientist’s career which begins with t ≡ 1 in the year of his/her
first publication, and begins to decline around time Ti which is the time horizon over which the scaling regularity holds
before termination and aging effects begin to dominate the career. In our analysis of academic career trajectories
Ni(t), we only analyze Ni(t) for t ≤ 40 years in order to account for such termination affects.
The smooth career trajectories which appear as a linear curve when plotted on log-log scale are characterized by an
amplitude parameter Ai and a scaling exponent αi. However, as indicated by Fig. S1, there are also non-stationary
Ni(t) which are dominated by “career shocks” that significantly alter the career trajectory. Such career shocks have
been demonstrated using publication impact measures (e.i. citations, and h-index sequences) [20, 24, 27], and here
we show that they even occur at the more fundamental level of individual production dynamics.
In order to analyze the characteristic properties of Ni(t) for all 300 scientists analyzed, we define the normalized
trajectory N ′i(t) ≡ Ni(t)/〈ni〉, where 〈ni(t)〉 is the average annual production rate of author i, and so by construction
N ′i(Li) = Li. Fig. S2(A) shows the characteristic production trajectory obtained by averaging the 100 individual
N ′i(t) for each dataset,
〈N ′(t)〉 ≡
〈Ni(t)
〈ni〉
〉
≡ 1
100
100∑
i=1
Ni(t)
〈ni〉 . (S8)
The standard deviation σ(N ′(t)) is shown in Fig. S2(B), which has a broad peak that is a likely signature of
career shocks that can significantly alter the career trajectory. The characteristic trajectory for each dataset are
well-approximated by the scaling relation
〈N ′(t)〉 ∼ tα (S9)
with characteristic scaling exponents α > 1 that are significantly greater than unity: α = 1.28± 0.01 for Dataset A,
α = 1.31±0.01 for Dataset B, and α = 1.15±0.02 for Dataset C. This fact implies that there is a significant cumulate
advantage in scientific careers which allows for the career trajectory to be accelerating. In Fig. S2(C) and S2(D) we
plot the analogous 〈N ′(t)〉 curves for professional sports metrics, where for this profession, α ≈ 1 for all measures
analyzed. This quantitative feature is likely due to the fact that annual production in professional sports is capped
by the limited number of opportunities provided by a season, whereas in academics, the number of publications a
scientist can publish is in principle unlimited. Also, in more labour-intensive activities are likely to experience smaller
returns since physical labor is non-cumulative with less spillover through time.
In Fig. S3 we plot each individual career trajectory using the rescaled time t′i = t
αi as an additional visual test of
the scaling model given by Eq. S7 . We show that on average, all curves i = 1..300 approximately collapse onto the
expected curve Ni(t)/Ai = t
′, where the residual difference i(t′) ≡ Ni(t)/Ai − t′ are likely due to career shocks of
various magnitudes. We plot the average and standard deviation of each set of 100 Ni(t)/Ai curves which show that
most of the shocks i(t
′), with some significant exceptions, lie within the 1σ standard deviation denoted by the error
bars. In Fig. S4 we plot the probability distributions P (αi) for each academic dataset. For each dataset, the average
value 〈αi〉 is in good agreement with α, the scaling parameter calculated for the corresponding trajectory 〈N ′(t)〉.
5III. EXPONENTIAL MIXING OF GAUSSIANS
The idea that entities are independent and identically distributed is an unrealistic assumption commonly made in
analyses of complex systems. The unconditional pdf P (r) is commonly analyzed in empirical studies where insufficient
data are present to define normalized r′i measures for each sample constituent i. Nevertheless, when modeling the
evolution of complex based on empirical data corresponding to distinct subunits (such as individual careers, companies,
or nation regions), unconditional quantities that account for variations in underlying production factors should be
used.
In the case of scientific output, there are many production factors that combine together and determine the amount
of human efforts needed to produce a unit of production. In general, consider the value fi,j of individual i corresponding
to his/her relative abilities in the production factor j = 1...J corresponding to a variety of attributes: knowledge,
genius, persistence, reputation, mental and physical health, communication skills, organization skills, and access to
technology, equipment and data, etc. In this study, we compare scientists who publish in similar journals. Still, the
scientific input required for each scientific output can vary by a large amount, largely depending on the technology
needed to perform the analysis, ranging from particle accelerators to just a pencil and paper.
In a very generalized representation, an unconditional distributions P (r), such as shown in Fig. 2(a-d) for production
change r, may follow from a mixture of conditional Gaussian distributions P (r|Si)
Pψ(r) =
∫ ∞
0
P (r|S)P (S)dS ≈
I∑
i=1
Pi(r|Si)P (Si) . (S10)
The underlying conditional distributions are characterized by the average 〈r〉Si and variance σ2i ≡ V Sψi
P (r|Si) = exp[−(r − 〈r〉)2/2V Sψi ]/
√
2piV Sψi . (S11)
which are each parameterized by the characteristic collaboration size Si. In cases where the average change 〈r〉 ≈ 0,
then the distribution P (r|Si) is characterized by only the fluctuation scale σi(r). Fig. S5 demonstrates that the
normalized production change r′i(t) = (r − 〈ri〉)/σi is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution. Hence, using
normalized variables, we have mapped the process to a universal scaling distribution P (r|Si).
When the distribution P (Si) is exponential,
P (Si) = λe
−λSi (S12)
then mixture is termed an “exponential mixture of Gaussians” [44], where the units have characteristic size Si =
1/λ. Fig. S10 shows that the distribution of collaboration radius Si is approximately exponential for each dataset,
supporting the case for exponential mixing. Using the cumulative distribution of S for each data set we calculate
λ = 0.15±0.01 [A], λ = 0.11±0.01 [B], and λ = 0.11±0.01 [C]. While the tail behavior of P (r) can be used to better
discriminate the value of ψ, we do not have sufficient data in this analysis to perform a more rigorous test of the tail
dependencies, or in general, to investigate the distribution of significantly large ri(t) values.
The scaling relation σi(r) ∼ Sψ/2i determines the functional form of the aggregate Pψ(r). Clearly, σ(r) increases
for ψ > 0 values, whereas for values ψ < 0, σ(r) decreases with size Si. This latter case is empirically observed for
countries and firms [49], whereby in general, large economic entities are able to decrease growth volatility by increasing
and diversifying their portfolio of growth products. In our analysis of scientific careers we define Si ≡Med[ki(t)], the
median number of distinct coauthors per year, as a proxy for the ability of the career to attract new opportunities,
and hence, as a proxy for the size Si of an academic career. For professional athletes, we define the career size as the
average number of points scored over the career Si ≡ 〈pi(t)〉. In Fig. 3 we calculate ψ/2 ≈ 0.40 ± 0.03 (regression
coefficient R = 0.77) for dataset [A], ψ/2 ≈ 0.22± 0.04 (R = 0.51) [B], and ψ/2 ≈ 0.26± 0.05 (R = 0.45) [C].
The role of mental, physical, and group spillovers is quite different in professional sports. Athletes attract future
opportunities largely through their historical track record, which is heavily weighted on performance in the near past,
and less on the cumulative history. Hence, for this performance-based labor force, we use a simple definition of “team
value” to define the career size Si. This quantity is easier to define for basketball, since there are smaller differences
between players of different team position than in other sports. For NBA player i we define Si as the average number of
points scored per year, Si ≡ 〈pi〉. Fig. S9 shows a crossover value Sc which we interpret to reflect the fact that sports
players typically fall into one of two categories: starters (everyday players) and replacement (game filler) players. We
calculate ψ/2 ≈ 0.38 ± 0.02 for emerging and “second string” careers with Si < Sc, and a decreasing size variance
relation (ψ < 0) for high-value careers with Si > Sc. Similar values occur in the MLB. These two ψ regimes reflect
the crucial balance of risk and reward in short-term contract professions.
6A variety of pdfs Pψ(r) can result from the exponential mixture of Gaussians
Pψ(r) =
∫ ∞
0
λe−λS
1√
2piσ2(r)
exp[−r2/2σ2(r)]dS (S13)
depending on the value of ψ which quantifies the size-variance relation. The functional form of Pψ(r) can vary in
both the bulk and the tails of the distribution [44]. A simple result which follows from the case ψ = 1 is the Laplace
(double-exponential) distribution
Pψ=1(r) =
√
λ
2V
exp
[
−
√
2λ
V
|r|
]
. (S14)
This distribution is a member of the family of Exponential power distributions which follow from the range of values
ψ ≥ 0 [44]. In general, if the scaling values are in the range ψ ≥ 0, then the exponential mixture leads to an
Exponential power distribution
P (r) =
β√
2σΓ(1/β)
exp[−
√
2(|r|/σ)β ] (S15)
with shape parameter β in the range β ∈ (0, 2] [44]. The pure exponential P (r) with β = 1 corresponds to the case
ψ = 1. The pure Gaussian P (r) with β = 2 corresponds to the case ψ = 0.
Furthermore, if the annual production is logarithmically related to an underlying production potential, ni(t) ∝
lnUi(t), then ri(t) ∝ lnUi(t) − lnUi(t − 1) quantifies the logarithmic change (“growth rate”) of Ui(t). This forms
the analogy with growth dynamics of large institutions with size S  1. For example, in the case of financial
securities such as the stock of a company i, the growth rate ri(t) measure the logarithmic change in the market’s
expectations of the company’s future earnings potential captured by the market capitalization and price [50]. As a
result, distributions P (r) of career growth fluctuation r, which we plot in Figs. 2 (a-d), can be seen as a bridge between
the micro level and the macro level of economic growth fluctuation. A theory of micro growth processes can help
improve the growth forecasts for economic organizations ranging in size from scientific collaborations to universities
and firms [33, 34, 44, 47–50].
IV. NONLINEAR PREFERENTIAL CAPTURE MODEL
Here we describe a stochastic system in which a finite number of opportunities are distributed to a system of
individual competing agents i = 1...I. The opportunities are distributed in batches of P opportunities per arbitrary
time interval. This model has two parameters.
(i) pi determines the preferential capture mechanism (the value pi = 1 corresponds to the traditional “linear”
preferential attachment model) and
(ii) c determines the performance timescale 1/c which is incorporated into the calculation of the capture rates of
each individual. The value c = 0 corresponds to a long-term memory and c 1 corresponds to short-term memory.
We use this simple model to show that a system governed by a preferential capture can become dominated by
fluctuations when c is large. The value 1/c quantifies the “performance appraisal timescale”: a small c corresponds
to a labor system with long contracts, or some alternative mechanism that provides employment insurance through
periods of low production, so that the ability to attract future opportunities is largely based on the cumulative record
of career achievement. Conversely, a large c corresponds to a labor system with short contracts in which the ability to
attract future opportunities is largely based on the accomplishments in the near past, requiring an agent to maintain
relatively high levels of production in order to survive. In this latter case, we find that (natural) fluctuations in the
annual production can cause a significant fraction of the careers to “fizzle out” leaving behind only a few “super
careers” who attract almost all of the opportunities. In other words, short contracts can tip the level of competition
into dangerous territory whereby careers are largely determined by fluctuations and not persistence.
A. System of competing agents
1) The system consists of I ≡ 1000 agents competing for P opportunities that are allocated in a single period.
There is no entry, hence the number I is kept constant. Also, P is also kept constant, so there is no growth in
the labor supply.
72) We run the Monte Carlo (MC) simulation for T ≡ 100 time periods and all agents are by construction from the
same age cohort (born at same time).
3) Each time period corresponds to the allocation of P ≡ ∑Ii=1 n0,i opportunities, sequentially one at a time, to
randomly assigned agents i, where n0,i ≡ 1 is the potential production capacity of a given individual.
4) The assignment of a given opportunity is proportional to the time-dependent weight (capture rate) wi(t) of each
agent. Hence, the assignment of 1 opportunity to agent i at period t results in the production (achievement)
ni(t) to increase by one unit: ni(t)→ ni(t) + 1. In the next time period t+ 1, we update the weight wi(t+ 1)
to include the performance ni(t) in the current period.
B. Initial Condition
The initial weight at the beginning of the simulation is wi(t = 0) ≡ nc for each agent i with nc ≡ 1. The value
nc > 0 ensures that competitors begin with a non-zero production potential, and corresponds to a homogenous system
where all agents begin with the same production capacity. Hence, we do not analyze the more complicated model
wherein external factors (i.e. collaboration factors) can result in a heterogeneous production capacity across scientists.
By construction, each agent begins with one unit of achievement ni(t = 1) ≡ 1.
C. System Dynamics
1) In each Monte Carlo step we allocate one opportunity to a randomly chosen individual i so that ni(t)→ ni(t)+1
2) The individual i is chosen with probability Pi(t) proportional to [wi(t)]pi
Pi(t) = wi(t)
pi∑I
i=1 wi(t)
pi
(S16)
where the value wi(t) is given by an exponentially weighted sum over the entire achievement history
wi(t) ≡
t−1∑
∆t=1
ni(t−∆t)e−c∆t . (S17)
The parameter c ≥ 0 is a memory parameter which determines how the record of accomplishments in the past
affect the ability to obtain new opportunities in the current period, and therefore, the future. The limit c = 0
rewards long-term accomplishment by equally weighting the entire history of accomplishments. Conversely, when
c 1 the value of wi(t) is largely dominated by the performance ni(t−1) in the previous period, corresponding
to increased emphasis on short-term accomplishment in the immediate past. Intermediate values 0 < c < 1
weight more equally the immediate past and the entire history of accomplishment.
3) The exponent pi determines how the relative ability to attract opportunities Pi/Pj = [wi(t)/wj(t)]pi depends
on the weights wi(t) and wj(t) between two individuals i and j. The linear capture case follows from pi = 1,
uniform capture pi = 0, super linear capture pi > 1, and sub-linear capture pi < 1.
4) At the end of each time period, the weight wi(t) is recalculated and used for the entirety of the next MC time
period corresponding to the allocation of the next I × nc achievement opportunities.
D. Model Results
We simulate this system for a realistic labor force size I = 1000 with the assumption that in any given period,
an individual has the capacity for one unit of production (nc ≡ 1). We evolve the system for T = 100 periods
corresponding to I×nc×T Monte Carlo time steps. The timescale T represents the (production) lifetime of individuals
with finite longevity. In this model we do not include exogenous shocks (career hazards) that can result in career
death [16]. Here we analyze four quantities:
1) The distribution P (N) of the total number of opportunities Ni(T ) ≡
∑T
t=1 ni(t) captured by agent i over the
course of the T− period simulation.
82) The distribution P (α) of the career trajectory scaling exponent αi defined in Eq. S7 which quantifies the
(de)acceleration of production over the course of the career.
3) The distribution P (r) of production outcome change r defined in Eq. 2 which quantifies the size of endogenous
production shocks.
4) The distribution P (L) of career length Li which measures the active production period of each career starting
from t = 0. We define activity as the largest period value Li for which ni(Li) = 0, which in other words,
corresponds to truncating all 0 production values from the end of the trajectory ni(t) and defining Li as the
length of this time series.
We display these four distributions, from left to right, for varying pi and c values, in each panel of Figs. S12 –
S16. Empirical distributions calculated from MC simulations are plotted as blue dots, with benchmark distributions
described below plotted as solid green curves. For each pi and c value we simulate 10 MC systems, and combine the
results into aggregate distributions which are shown. For simulations with pi > 1 the pdf data are aggregated over
the results of 50 MC simulations. We list below some of our main observations.
For pi = 1, independent of c, we observe exponential P (N), consistent with the prediction of the linear preferential
capture model in the case of no firm entry (b = 0) in the model of Kazuko et al. [43]. However, the distribution P (L)
and the distribution P (α) does depend strongly on c, reflecting the possibility of career “sudden death” for large c.
For the P (α) distributions (middle-left panels), the solid green line is a best-fit Gaussian distribution (using the
MLE method) for the set of αi values computed for careers that did not undergo “sudden death.”
For the P (r) distributions (middle-right panels), the solid green curve corresponds to a best-fit Laplace distribution
(using the MLE method) and the dashed red curve corresponds to a best-fit Guassian distribution (using the MLE
method) which we show only for benchmark comparison. Typical empirical distributions (values shown as blue dots)
range from being distributions that are Gaussian to distributions that are Laplacian in the bulk but with heavy tails.
For the P (L) distributions (right most panels), we note that the most likely career length L is typically either
L = 1 or L = T for all systems analyzed. However, there are likely c and pi parameter values corresponding to P (L)
that is uniform distributed over the entire range of L values, which may be an interesting class of system to analyze
in future analyses since such a system promotes diversity across the entire longevity spectrum. The system we show
for pi = 1.2 and c = 1 appears to be close to this scenario.
Fig. S12 shows the null model with no preferential capture (pi = 0). We confirm that the careers in this model
are driven by a stochastic accumulation process that is equivalent to a Poisson process with rate λp ≡ 1. In this
homogenous system, each career gains on average one opportunity each time period, so that at the end of the
simulation, the distribution P (N) is a Poisson distribution with 〈N〉 = λpT (shown as the solid blue line) which fits
the model data excellently. For these careers, the typical α = 1, the production changes are well-approximated by
a Gaussian distribution, and most careers are sustained for the maximum possible lifetime corresponding to T periods.
Fig. S13 shows the system with c = 0 corresponding to comprehensive career appraisal corresponding to a
long-term memory system. We analyze this system for 4 values of pi = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4. This “long-term memory”
scenario corresponds to a long-term contract profession whereby careers are less vulnerable to periods of low
production. As a result, most careers sustain production throughout the career.
Fig. S14 shows the system with c = 0.1 corresponding to an effective memory timescale of 1/c = 10 periods. We
analyze this system for 4 values of pi = 0.8, 1.0, 1.2, 1.4. This “medium-term memory” scenario yields a rich variety
of careers for pi = 1, but for pi = 1.2 the system becomes quickly dominated by “rich-get-richer” effects which results
in careers being vulnerable to low production fluctuations.
Fig. S15 shows the system with c = 1 corresponding to an effective memory timescale of 1/c = 1 period. We
analyze this system for 4 values of pi = 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.1. For all values of pi analyzed, we observe a system that is
dominated by careers that are cut short by the high levels of competition induced by the relatively high value placed
on continued production.
Fig. S16 shows the extreme case of a “no memory” scenario in which wi(t) ≈ ni(t − 1) whereby most careers
experience sudden death due to endogenous negative production shocks early in their career. The lucky few careers
9who survive this period end up as rich-get-richer “superstars.” This behavior occurs for all systems analyzed using 4
values of pi = 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, 1.05.
E. Discussion of the model in relation to the Academic labor market
One serious drawback of short-term contracts are the tedious employment searches, which displace career momentum
by taking focus energy away from the laboratory, diminishing the quality of administrative performance within
the institution, and limiting the individual’s time to serve the community through external outreach [3, 6]. These
momentum displacements can directly transform into negative productivity shocks to scientific output. As a result,
there may be increased pressure for individuals in short-term contracts to produce quantity over quality, which
encourages the presentation of incomplete analysis and diminishes the incentives to perform sound science. These
changing features may precipitate in a “tragedy of the scientific commons.”
Aside from promoting circumspect research, job security in academia diminishes the incentives for scientists to
“save and store” their knowledge for future liquidation in the case of employment emergency, and thus promotes the
institution of “open science” [1]. However, a policy shift towards short-term contracts, along with the heightened value
of intellectual property, may alter the course of publicly funded “open science.” This scientific commons emerged
from the noble courts during the Renaissance as a hallmark of the scientific revolution and now faces pressure from
what has been termed “intellectual capitalism,” with the vast privatization of knowledge and innovation (“closed
science”) occurring in public universities and corporate R&D [1]. An academic system that is dominated by short
term contracts, stymied by production incentives that favor quantity over quality, and jeopardized at the level of the
“open knowledge” commons, presents a new institutional scenario revealing selection pressures that could alter the
birth and death rates of high-impact careers.
The purpose of this stochastic model is to show how careers can become very susceptible to negative production
shocks if the labor market is driven by a preferential capture mechanism with γ > 1 whereby early success of an
individual can lead to future advantage. However, this model also shows that the onset of a fluctuation-dominant
(volatile) labor market can also be amplified when the labor market is governed by short-term contracts reinforced by a
short-term appraisal system. In such a system, career sustainability relies on continued recent short-term production,
which can encourage rapid publication of low-quality science. In professions where there is a high level of competition
for employment, bottlenecks form whereby most careers stagnate and fail to rise above an initial achievement barrier.
Instead, these careers stagnate, and in a profession that shows no mercy for production lulls, these careers undergo a
“sudden death” because they were “frozen out” by a labor market that did not provide insurance against endogenous
fluctuations. Such a system is an employment “death trap” whereby most careers stagnate and “flat-line” at zero
production. However, at the same time, a small fraction of the population overcomes the initial selection barrier and
are championed as the “big winners”, possibly only due to random chance.
Table demonstrates how the life expectancy decreases with increasing c even for the linear preferential capture model
corresponding to pi = 1. With increasing c, the model simulates systems with shorter contracts (shorter appraisal
“memory” timescales), and so larger percentages of the population die before characteristic ages Tc(p), values that
decrease with increasing c for a given p.
10
Tc(p) as a % of T , (% T )
p = 0.1 p = 0.25 p = 0.5 p = 0.75
c = 0 (long term) 0.94T 0.98T 1.00T 1.00T
c = 0.1 0.20T 0.79T 0.99T 1.00T
c = 1.0 0.01T 0.02T 0.05T 0.15T
c = 10.0 (short term) 0.01T 0.01T 0.02T 0.06T
TABLE S1: Decrease in career life expectancy as a result of short-term contract length in the pi = 1 linear preferential capture
model. The fraction p of the population that experienced career termination before the crossover age Tc(p): “p percent of the
population died before reaching the age L = Tc(p).” As c increases (recall the appraisal “memory” timescale is 1/c) towards a
short-term contract scenario, a significant fraction of the population (increasing p) dies before reaching a smaller and smaller
Tc(p). The empirical value of Tc(p) is given as a percentage of the maximum career length T corresponding to the stopping time
of the Monte Carlo simulation. The value Tc(p) is calculated using the equality p = CDF (T < Tc(p)), where CDF (T < L)
is the cumulative distribution function of career length L. To estimate CDF (T < L), we combine an ensemble of 10 MC
simulations for each c value. In the model simulations we use T ≡ 100 periods.
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FIG. S1: Positive career shocks likely associated with reputation boosts. Examples of career production trajectories Ni(t)
that have significant deviations from the scaling hypothesis in Eq. S7 . These significant deviations likely follow extraordinary
scientific discoveries (and the publicity and reputation that are typically rewarded) which can vault a career and result in
lasting benefits to the individual.
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FIG. S2: Regularities in the career trajectory Ni(t). We analyze the normalized career trajectory N
′
i(t) ≡ Ni(t)/〈ni〉 which
allows us to aggregate Ni(t) with varying publication rates 〈ni〉. As a result, we can better quantify the scaling exponent
α which quantifies the acceleration of the typical career over time. We calculate α using OLS regression on log-log scale of
the average normalized career trajectory 〈N ′(t)〉 ≡
〈
Ni(t)
〈ni〉
〉
. For reference, each N ′i(t) trajectory in panels A, B, and C has a
corresponding best-fit curve that is a dashed line. (A) For the scientific careers, we calculate α values: 1.28± 0.01 for Dataset
A, 1.31±0.01 for Dataset B, and 1.15±0.02 for Dataset C. These values are all significantly greater than unity, α > 1, indicative
of a systematic cumulative advantage effect in science. (B) The standard deviation σN ′(t) has a broad peak, likely related to
career shocks that can significantly alter the career trajectory. (C) The average normalized career trajectory for NBA careers
has α ≈ 1 (D) The average normalized career trajectory for MLB careers has α ≈ 1. For visual comparison, the solid straight
black line in panels A,B and C correspond to a linear function with α = 1.
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FIG. S3: Using scaling methods to show approximate data collapse of each Ni(t). Normalized trajectory N˜i(t) ≡ Ni(t)/Ai
plotted using the scaled time t′ ≡ tαi for each career over the time horizon t ∈ [1, 40] years. We plot the 100 N˜i(t) curves
belonging to datasets [A], [B], and [C] in the corresponding panels. There is approximate data collapse of all the normalized
trajectories N˜i(t) along the dashed green line corresponding to the rescaled career trajectory N˜i(t) = t
′ with α′ ≡ 1 by
construction. We also plot in red the corresponding average value 〈N˜i(t)〉 with 1σ error bars for logarithmically spaced t′
intervals. Deviations from 〈N˜i(t)〉 are indicative of career shocks which can significantly alter the career trajectory.
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FIG. S4: Increasing returns to scale α > 1. Probability distribution of the individual αi values calculated for each career
using the scaling model Ni(t) ∼ tαi over time horizon t ∈ [1, 40] years. The average 〈αi〉 and standard deviation σ(αi) for each
dataset are: 1.42± 0.29 [A], 1.44± 0.26 [B], 1.30± 0.31 [C]. The distribution of αi values indicate that career trajectories are
typically accelerating (αi > 1), most likely the result of a cumulative advantage effect.
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FIG. S5: Universal patterns in underlying production fluctuations of scientists. Accounting for variable individual publication
factors, such as academic subfield or group collaboration size, we find that the normalized annual production change r′i(t) ≡
[ri(t) − 〈r〉i]/σi is distributed according to a Gaussian distribution, with 〈r′〉 = 0 and σ(r′) = 1 by construction (solid lines
show best-fit Guassian distributions using the maximum likelihood estimator method). This results indicates that the Laplace
distribution shown in Fig. 2 results from a mixture of Gaussian distributions Pi(r = σir
′) that indicate that annual production
is consistent with a proportional growth model..
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FIG. S6: Universal patterns in the production fluctuations of athletes. For athlete careers in the NBA and MLB we define
production change for (A,C) the change in the number of in-game opportunities and (B,D) the change in the number of in-
game successes. (A,B) Since the detrended production change R is defined to have standard deviation σ ≡ 1, the pdfs P (R)
approximately collapse onto a universal “tent-shaped” Laplace pdf (solid green line). (C,D) For sports careers, we also define
a measure R′ which account for variable individual production factors, such as propensity for injury, team position, etc. As a
result normalized annual growth rate R′i ≡ [zi(t) − 〈z(t)〉]/σz(t) is normalized twice, once to account for age factors and once
to account for individual factors. The quantity zi(t) ≡ (ri(t)− 〈ri〉)/σi is normalized with respect to individual factors, where
〈ri〉 and σi are the average and standard deviation of the production change of career i. Then, we aggregate all zi(t) values for
a given career year t in order to calculate the average 〈z(t)〉 and standard deviation σz(t) over all careers. The final quantity
R′i represents a normalized annual production change which is distributed in the bulk according to a Gaussian distribution,
with 〈R′〉 ≈ 0 and σ(r′) ≈ 1 by construction (solid lines show best-fit Guassian distributions using the maximum likelihood
estimator method). This results indicates that the tent-shaped distributions in (A,B) results from a mixture of conditional
Gaussian distributions Pi(R = σiR
′) that indicate that annual production is consistent with a proportional growth model.
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FIG. S7: Universal micro-scale output distribution P (Q) which accounts for coauthorship variability. The normalized output
Q ∝ ni/kγii is a residual output after we quantitatively account for the collaboration size ki corresponding to the number of
distinct coauthors of author i. Each pdf is well-approximated by the Gamma distribution P (Q) ∝ Qm−1 exp[−Q/θ] which
suggests that production at the micro scale is governed by a Gamma Le´vy process. We calculate the Gamma distribution
parameters using the maximum likelihood estimator method (distributions shown by solid and dashed curves), and find an
insignificant difference between [A] and [B] scientists with Gamma shape parameter m and scale parameter θ. However, for
dataset [C] scientists, the output distribution is more skewed towards smaller Q values, possibly reflecting the relative advantage
that senior scientists gain due to reputation, experience, and knowledge spillover factors.
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FIG. S8: Aggregate production distributions can be deceiving. Unconditional distribution of annual publication rate n(t)
appears as log-normal distributions because it is a mixture of underlying distributions that depend strongly on collaboration
factors. We define ni(t) as the number of papers published in (A) ∆t = 1 and (B) ∆t = 2 year periods, which reduces the
finite-size effects arising from the calendar year labeling of publication dates. (A) We combine ni(t) values for all values of
t, and find excellent agreement between the empirical P (n(t)) data points and the log-normal model. We use the maximum
likelihood estimator method to calculate the log-normal parameters σL ≡ σ(lnn) and µ = 〈lnn〉. (B) In order to analyze the
time-dependence of P (n(t)), we separate ni(t) values from Dataset A into 5 subsets, depending on the range t years into the
career, as indicated in the figure legend. We offset each pdf by a constant factor in order to distinguish each pdf, which are
also well-approximated by log-normal distributions (shown as solid curves).
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FIG. S9: Quantifying the growth fluctuations of sports careers. The size variance relation for sports careers is similar to
academic careers for small Si. However, for relatively large Si the relation becomes decreasing corresponding to ψ < 0,
analogous to what is found for firm growth [34, 48–50]. The decreasing relation for Si > Sc likely follows from the fact that
in sports, there is a hard upper limit to the number of opportunities available to a player in a given year. Hence, individuals
with large Si are likely the starters on their teams, since it is neither economical nor in the strategy of winning to keep players
above a threshold value Sc out of the game, and so these players typically remain as positional starters except for episodic
leaves of absence due to injury. Hence, these players experience smaller σi(r) due to limitations to their potential for further
career growth. However, players with Si < Sc are typically on the fringe of being released or provide alternative value to the
team, and so these individuals experience larger fluctuations in team play because they are easily dispensable, especially in a
profession dominated by short-contracts lasting sometimes less than a year. For each dataset, we use careers with career length
Li ≥ 3 seasons. (A) NBA basketball players: Units of σi(R) are normalized minutes played. We define the scaling relation
σi(R) ∼ 〈pi〉ψ/2 between the average number of points scored per season 〈pi〉 =∑Lit=1 pi(t)/Li and the standard deviation σi(R).
In this way, we utilize the average points per season as the proxy for the ability of a player to obtain future opportunities
which are realized as minutes played. Using Sc ≡ 720 points, we calculate ψ/2 = 0.38 ± 0.02 (regression coefficient R = 0.50
and ANOVA F-test significance level p ≈ 0) for Si < Sc and ψ/2 = −0.25 ± 0.07 (R = 0.15 and p ≈ 10−3) for Si > Sc.
(B) MLB pitchers: Units of σi(R) are normalized IPO (innings pitched in outs). Interestingly, σi(R) continues to increase
for Si > Sc, possibly due to the relatively high career risk attributed to throwing arm injury. Using Sc ≡ 65 strikeouts, we
calculate ψ/2 = 0.37 ± 0.01 (R = 0.48 and p ≈ 0) for Si < Sc and ψ/2 = +0.15 ± 0.07 (R = 0.07 and p ≈ 0.02) for Si > Sc.
(C) MLB batters: Units of σi(R) are normalized AB (at bats). Using Sc ≡ 68 hits, we calculate ψ/2 = 0.44± 0.01 (R = 0.59
and p ≈ 0) for Si < Sc and ψ/2 = −0.37± 0.03 (R = 0.21 and p ≈ 0) for Si > Sc. The dashed black (blue) line in each panel
is a least squares linear regression on log-log scale for all data values with Si less (greater) than Sc. The data shown with error
bars represent the average 〈σi(R)〉 and corresponding 1 standard deviation values calculated using equally spaced Si bins on
the logarithmic scale.
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FIG. S10: Exponential distributions of coauthor radius in Physics. We test the hypothesis that the distributions P (r)
for annual production change r (shown in Fig. 2) follow from an exponential mixing of Gaussians with varying fluctuation
scale σi ∝ Med[ki(t)]ψ/2. An important criteria for this model is that the distribution of Si ≡ Med[ki(t)] is exponential,
P (Si) ∼ exp[−λSi]. We plot the cumulative distribution function (CDF) P (x > Si) for each dataset, and confirm that the
distributions are approximately linear on log-linear axes. Using linear regression, we calculate λ = 0.15±0.01 [A], λ = 0.11±0.01
[B], and λ = 0.11± 0.01 [C].
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FIG. S11: Approximately exponential distribution of scoring value in the NBA. We further test the hypothesis that the
distributions P (R) for annual production change R in professional sports (shown in Fig. 2 C and D) follow from an exponential
mixing of Gaussians with varying fluctuation scale σi ∝ 〈pi〉ψ/2. An important criteria for this model is that the distribution
of “team value” 〈pi〉 is exponential, P (〈pi〉) ∼ exp[−λ〈pi〉]. We plot the cumulative distribution function (CDF) P (x > 〈pi〉)
for each dataset, and confirm that the distributions are approximately linear on log-linear axes. We show the CDFs calculated
using all careers with career length Li ≥ Lc years, for Lc = 1, 3 years.
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FIG. S12: A production output null model with pi = 0 agrees with the predictions of a Poisson process. (Far left) The
cumulative distribution CDF (x > N) is in excellent agreement with the prediction of a Poisson process with rate λp = 1 and
corresponding average 〈N〉 = λpT = 100. The solid green curve is the corresponding Poisson CDF using 〈N〉 ≡ 100. (Middle
left) Furthermore, the typical scaling exponent 〈α〉 = 1 which is also consistent with Poisson trajectories. (Middle right) The
distribution of production changes is close to Gaussian. (Far right) The typical career length Li spans the entire system length
T , indicating low levels of career risk.
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FIG. S13: The production output model with c = 0. Results of MC simulations for a “long-term appraisal” scenario. Careers
are less vulnerable to low-production phases, and as a result, most agents sustain production throughout the career for a
relatively large range of pi values.
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FIG. S14: The production output model with c = 0.1. Results of MC simulations for a “medium-term appraisal” scenario.
The corresponding memory time scale is approximately 10 time periods, and so only for significantly large pi = 1.4 do we
observe a labor market scenario in which there is a significant death rate and just a few “big winners” corresponding to those
agents with α ≥ 1.
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FIG. S15: The production output model with c = 1.0. Results of MC simulations for a “short-term appraisal” scenario. The
corresponding memory time scale is approximately 1 time period. Even for pi < 1, the system is driven by fluctuations that can
cause career “sudden death” for a large fraction of the population. For pi > 1 we observe a very quick transition to a significant
death rate and just a few “big winners” corresponding to those agents with α ≥ 1.
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FIG. S16: The production output model with c = 10.0. Results of MC simulations for a “zero-memory appraisal” scenario
wherein only the previous period matters, wi(t) = ni(t− 1). Even for linear preferential capture pi = 1, the systems shows “no
mercy” for careers that are stagnant for possibly just one period. As a result, just a few “lucky” agents are able to survive
the initial fluctuations and end up dominating the system. For pi values close to unity, pi → 1, the systems quickly becomes an
employment “death trap” whereby most careers stagnate and “flat-line.”
